> ## Documentation Index
> Fetch the complete documentation index at: https://hevninc.mintlify.site/llms.txt
> Use this file to discover all available pages before exploring further.

> ## Agent Instructions
> HEVN accounts are non-custodial in both products. Self-serve (the General tab): the person who owns the email holds the only key and signs for themselves. Whitelabel (the Whitelabel and REST API tabs): the integrator's customer creates and owns their account through Sign in with HEVN, a HEVN-hosted popup on the integrator's site; the integrator's backend holds a developer key, operates linked accounts and books their payouts, and the account holder approves every payout in that popup. The developer key signs only for the integrator's own wallet; it never signs a client's money.
> Use HEVN's terms exactly. A rail is a bank route a client can request. A virtual account (bnk_) is an opened rail. Account details are what a payer needs in order to wire money, and arrive in a field named requisites. A client is a customer's own account linked to the integrator through Sign in with HEVN (POST /dapi/v1/connect/sessions, then POST /dapi/v1/clients/link); there is no API call that creates one. The business behind it is the integrator's customer. A contact is a saved destination; a beneficiary is the party at the far end of a fiat payout. Every departure of money is a payout, to a bank account or to a wallet alike.
> Never name a banking partner. Say 'a licensed banking partner'.
> There are no published fee rates, spreads or minimums. Prices come from a quote on a specific payment; direct pricing questions to HEVN rather than inventing numbers.
> The whitelabel API is at /dapi/v1 and takes a developer-key session plus an X-Hevn-Account header. Developer keys have an IP allowlist and no scopes. Remote transfers are at /api/v1/remote_spend_limit and take a remote transfer key (rsl_) in X-Api-Key, bounded by an onchain spend permission the account holder grants. They are different credentials and neither works on the other surface. The HEVN CLI is discontinued.

# Security model

> A summary of HEVN's trust boundaries: what each party can do, what happens in failure scenarios, and how to protect your account.

HEVN's security posture follows from one design decision: **the platform never holds keys or funds**. What the system does rely on is mapped honestly in [Trust assumptions](https://hevninc.mintlify.site/general/trust-assumptions.md). Everything else — the [Privy key layer](https://hevninc.mintlify.site/general/privy-wallets.md), the [Base smart wallet](https://hevninc.mintlify.site/general/smart-wallets.md), [one-time payout addresses](https://hevninc.mintlify.site/general/deposits-and-payouts.md), [1Click passive deposits](https://hevninc.mintlify.site/general/cross-chain.md) — exists to keep that invariant true on every flow.

## Who controls what

| Asset | Where it lives | Who controls it |
| - | - | - |
| Private key | Sharded (Shamir) across the user's session and Privy's TEE infrastructure; never assembled outside a TEE | User only |
| USDC balance | The user's smart wallet contract on Base | Onchain owners only (the user, plus anyone they [explicitly added](https://hevninc.mintlify.site/general/shared-access.md)) |
| Virtual account details, invoices, contacts | HEVN backend | HEVN, scoped by the user's JWT |
| Funds in a fiat payout | Banking partner's one-time address, then bank rails | Banking partner, for that payout only |
| Funds in a cross-chain swap | 1Click settlement layer, per one-time quote | NEAR Intents protocol, for that swap only |

## Failure scenarios

> [accordion] HEVN is fully compromised or disappears
>
> Funds at rest are unaffected. No HEVN system holds a wallet key or an owner role: an attacker with full control of HEVN's backend could read and tamper with metadata (invoices, contacts, bank detail records) but could not sign a single wallet operation. The wallet itself remains accessible through Privy — or via [key export](https://hevninc.mintlify.site/general/privy-wallets.md#exit-hatch-key-export) — and standard Base tooling; it is an ordinary onchain smart wallet.
>
> The exception is a [remote transfer key](https://hevninc.mintlify.site/remote-transfers/overview.md) you created yourself. HEVN derives the signer of each key's spender wallet server-side from the key your program sends, so a compromised backend could spend through such a key — but only within the spend permission you granted it, which the `SpendPermissionManager` contract enforces onchain. An account with no remote transfer keys has no such exposure.
>
> The honest residual risk is **display integrity**: a compromised platform could try to show a false destination address (a fake payout or deposit address) and let the user sign a transfer to the attacker. HEVN's primary defense is [provider isolation with signed responses](https://hevninc.mintlify.site/general/architecture.md#provider-isolation-signed-responses): payout details and one-time deposit addresses are fetched and signed by dedicated per-provider microservices, and the client verifies the signature before displaying anything — a forged address from the main backend fails verification. The last line of defense is still the signer: for large transfers, verify the destination through an independent channel before signing.

> [accordion] A HEVN JWT or remote transfer key leaks
>
> A leaked JWT exposes the platform surface only: reading data and editing metadata — no spending. A leaked [remote transfer key](https://hevninc.mintlify.site/remote-transfers/overview.md) adds, at worst, spending **within the onchain allowance the owner granted it** for the current period — the [`SpendPermissionManager`](https://hevninc.mintlify.site/general/shared-access#limited-access-spend-permissions) contract rejects anything beyond that. Delete the key in the app, which revokes its spend permission onchain; the wallet owner key itself is never exposed. See [Authentication](https://hevninc.mintlify.site/general/authentication.md#remote-transfer-keys).

> [accordion] Privy has an outage — or disappears entirely
>
> An outage delays signing (you temporarily can't authorize new operations), and no one else gains any capability during it. For the extreme case, the escape hatch is [key export](https://hevninc.mintlify.site/general/privy-wallets.md#exit-hatch-key-export): the exported owner key controls the smart wallet with standard Ethereum tooling, independent of both Privy and HEVN. Privy is a deliberate trust assumption of the current architecture — see [Trust assumptions](https://hevninc.mintlify.site/general/trust-assumptions.md).

> [accordion] Your email account is compromised
>
> This is the critical scenario. Without wallet MFA, whoever controls your email can complete Privy authentication and unlock the wallet. With [wallet MFA](https://hevninc.mintlify.site/general/privy-wallets.md#wallet-mfa-passkeys-and-otp) enrolled, email access alone is not enough — every key operation also requires your passkey or OTP code. Enable MFA and protect the email account itself — see below.

> [accordion] You lose access to your email account entirely
>
> This is the one scenario with no backdoor — by design. Privy [cannot recover an account or change its login methods](https://www.privy.io/user-help-center): no party, including HEVN, can reassign your identity to a new email. That is the same property that protects you from account takeover. Prepare in advance:
>
> * **Link a second login method** (e.g. Google alongside email) — losing one still leaves the other.
> * **Add a trusted full-access co-owner** ([Shared account access](https://hevninc.mintlify.site/general/shared-access.md)) — their wallet access is independent of your login, so the funds stay reachable even if your identity is lost entirely.

> [accordion] You lose your MFA factor (passkey or authenticator)
>
> Removing or replacing an MFA method [requires completing MFA first](https://docs.privy.io/authentication/user-authentication/mfa/advanced) — there is no administrative reset, by HEVN or by Privy. That is deliberate: a support-desk override would be a backdoor into everyone's wallet. Losing your **only** factor therefore locks wallet operations, so treat MFA factors like keys:
>
> * Enroll **at least two factors** (e.g. a passkey **and** a TOTP app) — losing one still leaves the other.
> * If there is someone you trust with the account, **add them as a full-access co-owner** ([Shared account access](https://hevninc.mintlify.site/general/shared-access.md)) — their access does not depend on your factors.

> [accordion] You lose your device
>
> Nothing is lost. The account is fully re-derivable from your email identity: sign in on any device, complete Privy auth, and your wallet is available. There is no device-only secret and no seed phrase.

> [accordion] A teammate with shared access goes rogue
>
> The blast radius depends on the access mode ([Shared account access](https://hevninc.mintlify.site/general/shared-access.md)). A **full owner** controls not just the money but access itself — they can spend the entire balance and add or remove other owners, including you. Grant that only to people you trust with the whole account. A **limited spender** is capped by the onchain spend permission: worst case, they drain the remaining allowance for the current period, nothing more. Either way, remove the owner or revoke the permission onchain; once confirmed, their key is cryptographically inert for this wallet.

> [accordion] A cross-chain swap fails mid-flight
>
> 1Click's intent lifecycle includes automatic settlement tracking and refunds; failed or expired intents return funds to the sender. See [Cross-chain deposits & withdrawals](https://hevninc.mintlify.site/general/cross-chain.md).

## Protect your email

Your email (or Google account) is the root of your HEVN identity. Recommended baseline:

* Enable **[wallet MFA](https://hevninc.mintlify.site/general/privy-wallets.md#wallet-mfa-passkeys-and-otp)** — a passkey or authenticator-app OTP required for every wallet operation, so a compromised mailbox alone cannot move funds.
* Enable **2FA** on the mailbox — preferably hardware security keys or passkeys, not SMS.
* Use a mailbox provider with strong account-recovery hygiene; lock down recovery phone numbers and backup addresses.
* For business accounts, use a dedicated, access-controlled mailbox rather than a personal one.

## Contract and infrastructure assurances

* The smart wallet contracts are Coinbase's open-source [Smart Wallet](https://github.com/coinbase/smart-wallet) (audit reports in the repository), running unmodified on Base under the canonical [ERC-4337 EntryPoint](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-4337).
* Key management inherits Privy's security model: Shamir's Secret Sharing plus TEEs with attestation. See [Privy security](https://www.privy.io/security).
* Every money movement is a public Base transaction, independently verifiable on [Basescan](https://basescan.org) — statements in HEVN are projections of onchain truth, not the source of it.

## Responsible disclosure

Found a vulnerability? Report it privately to **[p@gethevn.com](mailto:p@gethevn.com)** — include reproduction steps and impact. We triage every report and keep you updated through the fix. We will not pursue legal action for good-faith research that follows this policy.


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